We empirically examine the impact of Craigslist, a website providing classified advertising services, on local newspapers in the United States. We exploit temporal and geographic variation in Craigslist's entry and compare the pricing strategies of local newspapers for which classified ads are likely to be a significant portion of their revenue to others before and after Craigslist's entry. We find that these newspapers drop their classified ad rates more after Craigslist?s entry. Relative to other newspapers, these newspapers also experience an increase in subscription price, decrease in circulation share, and decrease in display ad rates. We find no evidence that the content of these newspapers differs from other newspapers following Craigslist's entry. These findings are consistent with a model viewing the newspaper industry as a three-sided market where the impact of Craigslist's entry in the classified ad side propagates to the reader and display ad sides.
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Introduction
The fate of traditional media such as radio, TV and newspapers has received much attention since the inception of the Internet (e.g., Athey, Calvano and Gans, 2010).
On one hand, the number of voices warning of traditional media's demise has increased over the years given the growing popularity of online media. On the other, in the past traditional media has survived threats from, and learned to coexist with, new technologies. For instance, the newspaper industry successfully responded to threats from radio in the 1920s and TV in the 1950s (e.g., Jackaway, 1995) . Quantifying the impact of the Internet on traditional media is difficult for several reasons. First, the gradual diffusion of the Internet is likely to be correlated with many macro trends that may also affect demand for traditional media. Second, different kinds of products or services on the Internet may affect traditional media in different ways. For example, the emergence of social media such as blogs and video-sharing sites draw consumers away from traditional media. The growing popularity of online advertising reduces the attractiveness of traditional media to advertisers. It is thus difficult to empirically identify mechanisms through which the Internet affects traditional media.
In this study, we take advantage of the temporal and geographic variation in entry by Craigslist, a website providing classified ad services, to examine its impact on local US newspapers. Craigslist offers classified ads for free in most cases. 1 In addition, ads on Craigslist are easy to search, and are updated in real time, unlike a newspaper. We therefore expect Craigslist's entry to significantly reduce the attractiveness of newspapers to classified ad buyers and thus reduce newspapers' classified ad rates. We adopt a differences-in-differences approach that compares local newspapers for which classified ads are likely to be a significant fraction of revenue to others before and after the entry of Craigslist. We identify such newspapers by whether or not the newspaper has a classified ad manager. We find 1 Craigslist charges for job listings in a small number of cities, and for apartment listings in New York City. Source: http://www. craigslist.org/about/factsheet, accessed May 2010. that these newspapers drop classified ad rates more than other newspapers following Craigslist's entry. Newspapers are platforms that link together three different groups: readers, classified ad buyers and display ad buyers 2 . Hence, we next examine how the impact of Craigslist's entry on the classified ad side propagates to the other two sides of the market. We find that newspapers with classified ad managers increase subscription prices relative to newspapers without classified ad managers following Craigslist's entry. As a result, their circulation shares drop more. Because of the drop in the circulation shares, their display ad rates decrease more as well following Craigslist's entry.
Finally, we find no evidence that the content of affected newspapers change with Craigslist's entry, which helps to rule out a change in newspaper targeting as an alternative explanation to our findings.
Our paper contributes to several streams of research. First, our work is related to the literature on incumbent responses to entry. Prior studies in strategy and economics literature have shown that incumbents may use a variety of competitive weapons such as pricing, advertising, new product introductions and excess capacity to respond to new entrants (e.g., Geroski 1995; Lieberman 1987 Lieberman , 1989 McCann and Vroom, 2010; Seamans 2010; Simon 2005 3 exclusively by advertising revenues. As the number of online content sites increased, many newspaper websites switched to subscription-based business models (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2010) . 3 The intuition is that when a new media platform enters a market, the number of advertisers available to incumbent platforms drops. Since part of the value of attracting consumers is that it allows the platform to raise price to advertisers, the return per customer decreases as the number of advertisers per incumbent decreases, making incumbent platforms less willing to under-price content to increase demand. Few studies except Jin and Rysman (2010) provide direct tests of this prediction 4 . Jin and Rysman study sportcards conventions and show that prices to consumers rise and prices to dealers drop as competition between platforms (the conventions) increases. As the directions of price changes hinge on the relative intensity of competition on each side of the market, their paper relies on variation in geographic distance between conventions to infer asymmetric degree of competition for consumers and dealers.
Our paper differs from Jin and Rysman in several aspects. First, Craigslist's entry only affects one side of the market as Craigslist does not provide any editorial content. Hence our empirical analysis provides a sharp test of how increased competition on one side of the market affects other sides. Second, our analysis in a three-sided market setting reveals that the direction of price change depends on the interdependency across different sides. In our setting, the display ad side does not interact directly with the classified ad side; they are linked to each other through the subscriber side. As a result, display ad rates actually drop as competition on the classified ad side intensifies. Finally, our study employs a differences-in-differences research design that uses panel data on newspapers together with Craigslist's geographical and temporal entry patterns. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information on Craigslist. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents results from our empirical analysis. Section 5 presents a simple model of a three-sided market that illustrates how the impact of Craigslist's entry in the classified ad side of the newspaper market propagates to the subscriber and display ad sides. We conclude in Section 6.
Craigslist's Expansion
Craigslist is a website that specializes in online classified listings. newspaper readers away from newspapers. Unlike Craigslist, these sites contemporaneously serve consumers in all regions in the US. As a result, we are able to use year dummies and their interactions with newspaper types to control for their overall effects on newspapers and disproportionate effects on different types of newspapers. Second, the theoretical result that price on one side of a two-sided market increases is contingent on the condition that the competition increases more significantly on the other side. In our setting, we expect to see significant increase in competition on the classified ad side relative to the subscriber side. Hence, our setting is ideal for testing the direction of price changes. Third, one of the empirical challenges of studying multi-sided markets is collecting price data on all sides of the market. For example, video games are a canonical example of a two-sided market, but researchers do not observe the contractual agreement on prices between console providers and game publishers. We are able to collect prices on all three sides of the newspaper market. We use internetarchive.org to access historical pages of Craigslist for each year of all of the markets in our sample, and from these pages we gather counts of the numbers of posts in each category. For example, in Boston on February 7 under the category "sale/wanted" there were 2,725 posts listed under "general for sale"
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and 730 posts listed under "items wanted" (see Figure 2 ). These category counts are then aggregated up to the market level to create a variable number_of_postsit which we use in robustness checks described below. Over the years, Craigslist added new categories such as personals. To ensure that we can compare the number of posts on
Craigslist in different years, we only aggregate counts in four categories (community, housing, jobs and sales/wanted) that Craigslist had since its inception.
When internetarchive.org archives the same Web page multiple times in a single year, we take the average of these counts.
Empirical Analysis
Impact of Entry on Classified Ad Side
Our goal is to study how local newspapers respond to entry by Craigslist. To do this, we first focus on the effect of Craigslist's entry on classified ad rates. The empirical design relies on a differences-in-differences approach that compares classified ad rates after Craigslist's entry to rates before Craigslist's entry for 9 newspapers with a classified ad manager to those without. The specification will be of the following form:
where classified_ad_rateit, craigslist_entryit , and classifiedit are as described above, Xit is a vector of other market control variables, γi is a newspaper fixed effect and ηt is a year fixed effect. Inclusion of the newspaper fixed effect controls for any fixed differences across newspapers and the year dummies control for common macroeconomic shocks. Some macroeconomic shocks (e.g., the diffusion of
Monster.com, a job listing website) may differentially affect newspapers with different degrees of reliance on classified ad businesses. We therefore include interactions between classifiedit and year dummies in Xit. We also include a count of the number of Internet service providers in the market, average_ISPsit, in Xit to address changes in the relative ease of Internet access, which might affect local newspaper's classified ad business. We cluster the error terms at the level of the newspaper to account for autocorrelation in the data across newspapers and over time (Bertrand et al, 2007) . Craigslist acts as a substitute for newspapers' classified services is consistent with prior studies on the relation between online and offline channels (Filistrucci, 2005; George, 2008; Brynjolfsson et al. 2009; Forman et al. 2009; Tucker 2011a, 2011b) .
Propagation of Craigslist's Entry to Other Sides
We next investigate how the effect of Craigslist's entry propagates to the reader side and display ad side. We focus on three dependent variables:
newspaper's subscription prices, circulation shares and display ad rates. We replicate Models 3 and 5 from Table 2 (i.e., with and without average_ISPsit, respectively) and report the results in Table 3 . We find that the coefficient on classifiedit*craigslist_entryit is significant in all models except Model 5, suggesting
Craigslist's entry does influence the reader side and display ad side. In particular, we find that subscription prices of these affected newspapers increase by 3.6%, yearly circulations drop by 5.7%, and display ad rates drop by 3.5% (based on Models 2, 4 and 6, respectively). It is worth noting that the magnitudes of the effects presented in Table 3 are small relative to the effects presented in Table 2 . These results accord well with the idea that the immediate effect of Craigslist's entry is to the newspaper's classified ads business, but that the effect of Craigslist's entry
propagates into the other sides of the market gradually. In Section 5, we use the findings presented in Tables 2-3 to motivate a simple model of how these effects propagate from one market into the others.
Exploring Robustness
One benefit of studying newspaper responses to Craigslist is that Craigslist's product is similar across markets in a given year, making it easy to compare entry Craigslist enters a county and is some positive number in all years after Craigslist enters. Table 5 provides regression results for the four outcome variables, classified_ad_rateit, subscription_priceit, circulation_shareit and display_ad_priceit. The signs on the coefficient classifiedit*craigslist_entryit match the signs described in Tables 2 -3 .
We are also concerned about the possibility that the observed newspaper responses are a result of repositioning of newspapers. Indeed, other research shows that newspaper content becomes more targeted in response to competition (George and Waldfogel, 2006; Chandra, 2009 ). To examine whether newspapers become more targeted in response to Craigslist's entry, we investigate the effect of Craigslist's entry on shares of different types of editors at each newspaper. We present the results of these analyses in Table 4 . In Model 1, we examine how
Craigslist's entry affects content variety of newspapers by focusing on total_positionsit. In Models 2-11, we explore targeting by focusing on the share of each editor type. In all models, the coefficient of the interaction term classifiedit*craigslist_entryit is insignificant, indicating that those newspapers with a classifieds editor who experience entry by Craigslist behave no differently in setting their content than other newspapers. Hence, there is little evidence that any of the responses by these affected newspapers are driven by content shifts.
Finally, we are concerned that Craigslist's entry may be endogenous. While our fixed-effects specifications control for time-invariant unobservables specific to newspapers and locations, it is still possible that Craigslist's entry decisions may be correlated with some time-varying unobservables. This concern is somewhat alleviated by the peculiar nature of Craigslist's corporate mission. Craigslist is incorporated as a for-profit company, but is not necessarily a profit maximizing company. For example, it still uses the ".org" domain, whereas a for-profit company would typically use the ".com" domain. The reason the company does so is that the ".org" domain "symbolizes the relatively non-commercial nature, public service mission, and non-corporate culture of craigslist." 14 The fact that the company does not actively work to maximize profits is well documented in the press. For example, in its annual ranking of top private digital companies, Silicon Alley Insider estimates that Craigslist generated about $150M in ad revenue in 2009, but could have generated at least $1B. 15 Thus, given that the company does not try to maximize profits, it is plausible that Craigslist's entry into newspaper markets is orthogonal to profit characteristics of the newspapers in those markets.
To systematically address the possibility of endogeneity, we take advantage of the geographical and temporal variation in Craigslist's entry to examine factors influencing Craigslist's entry decisions. We run hazard models to predict Craigslist's entry into a newspaper's market as a function of county demographics in which the newspaper is located as well as newspaper characteristics. Table 6 presents the results. Model 1 of Table 6 includes market characteristics such as the demographic variables agei, populationi and incomei, and average_ISPsit. Model 2 adds in newspaper characteristics including classifiedit, independenti and newspaper_agei.
We find that populationi is a significant predictor of Craigslist's entry and this factor is controlled in our analysis by the use of fixed-effects. In addition, adding newspaper characteristics does not increase explanatory power of the model much, and none of the three newspaper characteristics are significant. The result increases our confidence in the exogeneity of Craigslist's entry.
We also conduct a falsification test using Craigslist's entry pattern to examine the role of location-specific unobservables. We compare pricing strategies of newspapers that would be affected by Craigslist's entry (i.e., those newspapers with 13 specifications, our data will produce false positive associations between Craigslist's entry and the pricing strategies of these affected newspapers in periods prior to
Craigslist's entry in their markets. To check this, we first create a new variable, eventual_entryi, which is 1 if Craigslist enters location i at any time before 2008 and 0 otherwise. We then repeat our differences-in-differences analysis by replacing craigslist_entryit with eventual_entryi and only analyzing observations for which craigslist_entryit is 0. Table 7 reports the results. We find that there is no significant correlation between each of the four outcome variables, classified ad rate, price, circulation share and display ad rate, and the interaction between eventual_entryi and classifiedit during periods prior to Craigslist's entry into their markets. The effect of eventual_entryi is absorbed by the newspaper fixed effects. The absence of such false positives further increases our confidence in the exogeneity assumption and also in the conclusion that the observed newspaper responses are caused by
Craigslist's entry.
A Simple Model
In this section, we present a simple stylized model to study the impact of 14 The setup is similar on the side of display advertisers. Assume the size of display advertisers is n. We similarly obtain that the newspaper profit from display
On the subscriber side, we assume that the market size is S and the demand for the newspaper, i.e., circulation, is
(1 ) D S p . Hence, the newspaper subscription profit will be Dp .
The total profit of the newspaper is thus:
The newspaper maximizes its profit by setting ,  and p simultaneously. Taking the first order conditions with respect to ,  and p, we have:
The equations are intuitive. As the number of potential classified advertisers or display advertisers increases, the newspaper is more willing to lower the subscription price to increase its subscription. In addition, the classified ad rate and display ad rate increase as price decreases because a lower price increases subscription, making the newspaper more attractive to advertisers. When a competitor, such as Craigslist, enters it attracts classified advertisers away from the incumbent newspaper. Thus, competitor entry reduces the number of potential classified advertisers, m, for the newspaper. As m decreases, p increases, and  and  decrease. In addition, the circulation share, / DS , decreases.
The model helps to interpret our empirical findings. The model suggests that
Craigslist's entry in the classified ads market decreases the classified ad rate and thus reduces the return per reader. As a result, the newspaper has a lower incentive to subsidize the subscriber side and the subscription price increases. The increase in subscription price in turn leads to lower circulation, making the newspaper less attractive to display advertisers. Display ad rates drop as a consequence.
The relationship between classified ad rate and subscription price is consistent with findings in Hagiu (2009), Godes, Ofek and Sarvary (2009) and Jin and Rysman (2010) . We extend these findings by showing that in a three-sided market setting an increase in competition on one side does not necessarily increase prices on other sides. The direction of price change depends on the interdependency across different sides. In our case, the display ad side does not interact directly with the classified ad side; they are linked to each other through the subscriber side.
Concluding Remarks
Broadly, this study helps build an understanding of how incumbent media platforms respond to technologically disruptive entrants from different industries.
This issue is important because the boundaries between media industries are blurred for advertisers today as they can reach relevant consumers through a variety of channels such as TV, the Internet and mobile devices. This study quantifies the impact of Craigslist on local newspapers in the United States. We provide evidence that following Craigslist's entry, newspapers with classified ad managers experience a decrease of 18.5% in their classified ad rates, an increase of 3.6% in subscription price, a decrease of 5.7% in circulation and a decrease of 3.5% in display ad rates. The responses are consistent with a model of a three-sided market which suggests that competition on one side of a platform's market may influence the platform's strategies on other sides.
While we are able to take advantage of geographic and temporal variation in
Craigslist's entry patterns to rule out a number of alternative explanations, a few limitations remain. For example, while we observe that newspapers with classified ad managers are more likely to experience a decrease in display ad rates, we cannot identify whether this decrease is due to the decrease in newspaper subscribers, as suggested by our model, or due to some small display advertisers substituting away from higher priced display ads to simple online classified ads after Craigslist's entry.
On the other hand, as display advertisers are often less price-sensitive and care more about their brand images than classified advertisers, we expect the effect from the latter case to be small.
Second, subscribers' substitution away from newspapers to other forms of media, such as Craigslist, may also contribute to the drop in newspaper circulation.
This might occur, for example, if a portion of the circulation is to individuals who purchase newspapers in order to search classified ads for temporary work opportunities. However, our focus on yearly subscription prices and circulation data help alleviate this concern.
Finally, we treat newspapers independent of each other, when in fact many newspapers are owned by the same parent firm. One possibility is that a newspaper with a parent which owns newspapers in other markets which experienced
Craigslist's entry may have moved further down the learning curve (Lieberman, 1987) and be able to react faster to Craigslist's entry. For example, such newspapers may drop classified advertising rates in anticipation of Craigslist's entry in an attempt to lock in classified advertisers. To the extent this occurs, it biases against our finding a result, suggesting that the full effect of Craigslist's entry on newspaper classified advertising rates may be understated. In any case, a full understanding of how a newspaper group learns from Craigslist's entry is beyond the scope of the current paper, but is one area for future research. Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 
